

"New" CIA filing - that the production in defense production is not and now being

TELOS on the spot.

political system of the USSR. The considerable effort that the activation of a wartime economy demands would only exacerbate these weaknesses, which could possibly have a stronger effect than the corrective measures which seem hardly effective now, in peacetime. To the extent that the structural faults of the Soviet economy are at the same time the inherent weaknesses of the entire system, it is possible that the nearly unavoidable aggravation of these faults in wartime would be as nearly capable of endangering the survival of the regime as the hostile military operations whose force would eventually be felt.

It seems rather unlikely that the military heads of the USSR would be inclined to engage themselves in a war with the prospect of remaining without sufficient reinforcements after a certain passage of wartime. Is not the observable and conventional stockpiling of arms a process of accumulation on the part of those constrained to calculate in terms of the weaknesses of their backup system? But it is even less likely that the Soviet leaders, whether military or civil, would accept the highly probable collapse of the entire system as the price of an eventual war. Everything leads one to believe they would be able to prevent disaster only with difficulty, faced with adversaries endowed with forces comparable to their own and with a more efficient economy. But one could equally conceive that by likening their defeat to a planetary catastrophe, they would hardly hesitate to engage their powers to effect massive annihilation once the disintegration of their regime becomes obvious.

One ought not excessively fear the sight of victorious Soviet troops soon marching through the streets of Paris. But one can foresee that the Soviet leaders will not fail to intervene *manu militanti* in the regions which they regard as their legitimate sphere of influence, principally in developing countries, once the slightest possibility of or the slightest excuse for modifying the current division of the world in their favor presents itself. We must not, however, be mistaken: it is not the overwhelming supremacy, but rather the opposite — the weakness of the USSR — which will facilitate their task. It is not the unbounded power, but the extreme vulnerability of the Soviet system, which makes the threat of blackmail weigh mutually on the nations that would be capable of holding them in check but which could not be able to risk escalation in order to resolve local conflicts whose dynamics are of no direct importance. FEAR/THREAT OF SOV PREEMPTIVE CAP.

One can sleep quietly in the developed countries of the West and the Soviet leaders ought not worry about any imminent danger when thinking about the unthinkable war against redoubtable adversaries. The weaknesses of the Soviet regime keep vigil over our security as well as over that of the Soviet leaders, even if these weaknesses hardly guarantee peace for the peoples of the Third World, of the USSR, or of certain of its satellites. Only the prospect of a nuclear disarmament would be capable of endangering the shaky balance of terror that at present protects the Soviet chiefs, but this disarmament is further away than ever today, when it is precisely the threat of mutual destruction that these chiefs need to maintain their tactical operations. The arms race and nuclear proliferation

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uncontrollable, render the prospect of disarmament always less probable, at the same time they possess the merit of supporting Soviet strategy and furnishing material to the Soviets' pacifist rhetoric which justifies this strategy.

Soviet realities seem a little more complex than Castoriadis supposes. The armament effort and the underdevelopment of the non-military sectors of the economy can hardly be accepted by themselves as the key to the analysis of Soviet society, and even less as a compass able to indicate the future orientation of the Soviet regime. Even though the Soviet arsenal is very impressive and its development constitutes a phenomenon undeniably disquieting, these two facts, however important, certainly are not enough to explain everything that is essential to the nature and to the evolution of the Soviet universe.

If, on the other hand, a veteran of socio-political analysis like Castoriadis can be moved to create an entirely new conception of the Soviet system on the basis of two facts so untested and so uncharged with explicative value, then one is as justified worrying about the manner Soviet realities tend to be deciphered at present, as about the meaning and the dangers of the arms race. In fact, contrary to the possibly demystifying intentions of analyses of this genre, nothing contributes more to the construction of myths than the excessive amplification of the significance of certain phenomena torn and separated from their context, the concealment, certainly in good faith, behind two or three more or less arbitrarily chosen trees, of an entire overgrown jungle of facts and problems.

The accumulation of gigantic arsenals, the constant perfecting of military equipment, the arms race, nuclear proliferation, and the easy recourse to force in international relations are phenomena extremely disquieting and give immediate importance to the debate that Castoriadis has the merit of having launched. It would be unfortunate, though, if the discussion was forced to develop without our being able to comprehend all the complexity of the data and of the implied questions. Similarly, it is deplorable that the image one has of the Soviet Union resembles more and more that of those strange and monstrous animals with which the ancients populated the distant lands.

One knows today that a furtive glance of an inexperienced traveler is often enough to transform into frightening dragons mere common animals, which though certainly dangerous, are far less enormous and formidable than the one detail seized upon would suggest, and the one which scholarly writings will not cease to amplify thereafter. The development of zoology has succeeded in correcting these errors, sometimes after hundreds of years of observation and experiment. But do we have enough time to harmonize our knowledge of the USSR with the demands and challenges of our age, when one must be convinced daily that even the most lucid minds seem not to surpass the methods and vision of Pliny's contemporaries with respect to Soviet realities?

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script for new movement ...

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Threat of ^{SU} prompt attack —
constitutes a constraint that of
a mutually-destructive attack: under
certain circumstances.

(see Rittersporn, TELOS 51, p. 30)

This could be used to deter Western (NATO)
escalation of an SU attack: TW
areas where SU has a local superiority:
* does not have to escalate itself to
avoid defeat or stalemate.